Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Spencer C.
Taylor : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for Appellant;
Joseph S. Jones C. H. Henderson; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, No. 9820 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4168

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF

;~,l. E"'·'0
r ,. ,. -

i.)

Lt

~·

\JU'-

Walker_Bank & Trust Company, ;:")t:J
___ _
a Utah corporation,
___________ ___ , c~-~;t:-ut"~-h
Plaintiff-Respiiiedeitt~.-e
:1(-

No.

v.
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and State Bank
of Provo, a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

9947

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County
Honorable A. H. Ellett

A. Pratt Kesler
Attorney General
H. Wright Volker
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
Spencer C. Taylor
Peter W. Billings
John F. Lee
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continenetal Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
State Bank of Provo
JosephS. Jones
C. E. Henderson
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON
Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
SponsoredAttorneys
by the S.J. Quinney
LawRespondent
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
for
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF CASE-----------------·--···--··-····-·---·
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT --------------

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS---------------------------------ARGUMENT
I. A. Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated
1953, does not prohibit the establishment of a
branch bank in a city of the second class where
there is already located one or more branch banks...

2

1

4

B. Plaintiff's office in Provo is a branch and
plaintiff's method of acquisition of that branch
gives it no special standing to contest defendant's
branch. -----------------------------------------------------------------------· 16
II. Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
does not prohibit the State Bank of Provo from
establishing a branch bank in its own community... 23
A. The restriction expressed in section 7-3-6 as
to the location of branch banks refers only to cities
or towns other than one in which the principal
banking house of the bank concerned is located ... 24
B. Plaintiff does not have the standing to assert
that defendant's presence in Provo precludes defendant from establishing a bank there. __________________ 39
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------- 47
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. Y. Cram,
85 Neb. 586, 123 N.W. 1045, Aff'd 228 U.S.70
(1912) ···································································· 5
Christensen v. Slawter, 173 Cal. App. 2d 325,
343 P.2d 341 (1959) .......................................... 6
Chrysler Corp. v. ~mith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W.
87, 135 A.L.R. 900, 907 (1941) ........................ 15
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United Truck
Lines, Inc., 330 P.2d 522 (1958) ...................... 46
DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Department of Employment, 56 Cal. 2d 62,362 P.2d 487,491 (1961) .. 12-13
F.T.C. v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U.S. 349,
351 ( 1940) ....... ······ .. ·········· ························.. .. ... ... . 14
First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri,
263 u.c. 640 ( 1923) ·········································· 27
Guillot v. State Highway Comm. of Montana,
102 Mont. 157,56 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1936) ........ 14
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114,
152 P.2d 98, 108 (1944) .................................... 35
~Iichigan National Bank v. Gidney, 237 F.2d 762
(D.C. Cir. 1956) ............................................ 18-42
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 120,
97 p .2d 937' 939 ( 1940) ································ 35-36
Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. U.S., 228 U.S.
294, 313 ( 1932) ·················································· 10
Oliver v. Spitz, 76 Nev. 5, 348 P.2d 158 {1960) .... 13
Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d 766,
768 (1951) ···························································· 5
Stanford v. Butler, 142 Texas 692, 181 SW2d 269,
153 A.L.R. 1054, 1063 {1944) .......................... 15
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
State Bank of l{enmore v. Bell, 197 Misc. 97,
96 N.Y.2d 851 (1950) ...................................... 13
State ex rei Louisiana Trust & Savings Bank v.
Board of Liquidation, 136 La. 571, 67 So. 370
(1915) --------------------------------------------------------------·-···· 42
State ex rei York v. Board of Commissioners,
28 \Vash. 2d 891, 184 P.2d 577, 590 (1947) ...... 14
State v. Department of Transportation of Wash.,
33 W ash.2d 448, 206 P .2d 456, 477 ( 1949) .... 13
Strong v. Campbell, 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 135 (1851) .. 42
Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422,
211 P.2d 190,193,194, (1949) ........ 21, 25, 26,48
U.S. v. American Trucking Asso., 310 U.S. 534,
549 ( 1939) -----------·-------·······························---------- 14
U.S. v. Cerecado Hermanos, 209 U.S. 337 ( 1908) .. 14
Walgren Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
62 Wyo. 297, 166 P.2d 960, 963 (1946) .......... 12
Whitcomb Hotel v. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal.2d 753, 151 P.2d 233, 236
(1944) .................................................................... 15
STATUTES
Act of February 25, 1927, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228,
12 u.s.c. § 36 (1945) -----------------------------------·-····· 29
Banking Act of 1933, § 23, 48 Stat. 612, 12 U.S.C.
§ 36 (c) ( 1945) ··························-····-··········-········· 31
Laws of Utah, 1911, Chapter 25, Section 32 .... 17-24
Laws of Utah, 1933, Chapter 6 ............................ 17-24
Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapter 10 ................................ 26
Laws of Utah, 1953, Chapter 8, Section 4 ................ 26
Laws of Utah, 1963, Chapter 7, Section 6 .... 40-41-44
111
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
1:! u.s.c. § 36 (c) ------------------------------------------··-- 10-11-21
12 u.s.c. § 214 (b) --------·····-------------------------·--------------- 20
7-1-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ---------------------------- 43
7-1-23 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ---------------------------- 44
7-1-26 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ____ 3-40-41-42-43-44
7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953
------------------------------------------ 2-3-4-6-14-16-18-23-44
7-3-39 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ------------------------------ 22
7-6-1 (3) Utah Code Annotated 1953 ---------------------- 20
7-6-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ················------------ 21
7-6-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ················-- 19-20-21
7-6-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ·················-··------·--- 20
54-7-16 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ·····----·-··-··-------- 47

OTHER AUTHORITIES
130 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 3981 ------ 30
65 Congressional Record 11297 ............................ 29-30
67 Congressional Record 3248, 2832 .............. 27-28-30
68 Congressional Record 2179 ------------------------------------ 27
76 Congressional Record 2026 .................................. 31
House Committee on Banks and Commerce,
71 Cir.2d Sess. p. 141 ---------------------------------------- 32
Opinion of Attorney General, December 20, 1956,
No. 56-142 -------------------------------------------------------- 7-8-9
Restatement, Torts, Section 710 ----------------------------···· 41
Sutherland on Statutory Construction,§ 241,
at 320 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 35-36
U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV ------------------············ 38
Utah Constitution, art: I, § 7 ·········--·------------------------ 38
lV

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

Walker Bank & Trust Company,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

v.

No.

Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and State Bank
of Provo, a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

9947

APPELL~TS'

BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by
'V alker Bank & Trust Company to have declared
illegal the establishment by the State Bank of Provo
of a branch bank on the Brigham Young University
campus in Provo, Utah.
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DISPOSITION JN LO,VER COURT
The case was decided on the merits on facts stipulated by all of the parties. The trial court granted
judgment in favor of plaintiff on the ground that under
the provisions of section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, the existence of the defendant bank in Provo
precludes the establishment by it of a branch bank in
that city. The court granted injunctive relief to the
plaintiff, but, on stipulation of the parties, suspended
the injunction during the time within which this appeal
is taken, and until the final determination of the appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek reversal of the judgment, and
a judgment in their favor. They also seek dissolution
of the injunctive relief granted by the lower court.
STATElVIENT

0~_,

FACTS

Walker Bank & Trust Company, a Utah banking
corporation, having its head office in Salt Lake City
and some thirteen branches in the State of Utah, including a branch in Provo, Utah, seeks to have declared
illegal a branch bank established on the Brigham Young
University campus in Provo, Utah, by State Bank of
Provo, a Utah banking corporation, having its only
other and principal banking house in Provo, Utah.
Provo City is not a city of the first class. At all
times material there were located and operating in

2
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Provo the defendant, State Bank of Provo, a branch of
plaintiff, 'Valker Bank & Trust Company, and a branch
of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. On October 15,
1962, defendant State Bank of Provo, as required by
section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, filed an
application with the defendant State Bank Commissioner to establish a branch on or near the Brigham
Young University campus in Provo, Utah. On October
25, 1962, also in accordance with the provisions of section 7-3-6, the application was approved by the defendant Bank Commissioner and the Governor. The branch
was opened for business on December 20, 1962. No
protest to the application was filed by plaintiff, and no
appeal to the State Board of Examiners, as required
by section 7-1-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was
taken by plaintiff. Instead, this action was filed in
November 1962. Other pertinent facts as set forth in
the Stipulation of Facts are referred to in the course
of the argument.
This case presents the basic question of whether
the applicable Utah statute-section 7-3-6, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 -- prohibits the establishment of a
branch by a bank in the same city in which its principal
banking house is located, particularly where, as here,
the only other banking facilities in the city are branches
of banks having their head offices elsewhere. Also presented is the ancillary question as to whether plaintiff
has the necessary standing to raise the basic question.

3
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ARGUMENT

I.
A. SECTION 7-3-6 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DOES NOT PROHIBIT
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRANCH
BANK IN A CITY OF THE SECOND
CLASS 'iVHERE THERE IS ALREADY
LOCATED
ONE
OR MORE
BRANCH
BANKS.
The plaintiff's principal argument below was that
the defendant bank could not establish a branch in
Provo because plaintiff already had a branch there. It
argued that a "branch" is a "bank" within the meaning
of the first sentence of the fourth paragraph of section
7-3-6. That sentence reads as follows:
"Except in cities of the first class, or within
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city
·of the first class is located, no branch bank shall
be established in any city or town in which is
located a bank or banks~ state or national regularly transacting a customary banking business,
unless the bank seeking to establish such branch
shall take over an existing bank." (Emphasis
supplied.)
· It is defendants' position that the legislature carefully distinguished between "banks" - meaning unit
banks or the principal offices of banking institutions and ."branch banks"- meaning branch offices of banking institutions. The distinction has been clearly understood by the Attorney General of the State of Utah

4
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and has been followed by the Bank Commissioner of
Utah and the Comptroller of the Currency in their
administration of the law since it was enacted.
The defendants urge this court to rule that since
defendant was the only bank regularly transacting a
banking business in Provo at the time its application
was made and its permit granted, the existence of plaintiff's branch in Provo did not preclude the establishment of defendant's branch there.
The cardinal principle of statutory construction
Is determination of the legislative intent. Rogers v.
JVagstaff~ 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d 766,768 (1951) and
cases there cited. The intention of the Utah legislature
in enacting the sentence above quoted can be discerned
from well settled canons of construction which are
imputed to have been within the knowledge of the legislature, which is presumed to be conversant with the
established rules of st~tutory construction. Chicago~
Burlington ~ Quincy Railroad Co. v. Cram~ 85 Neb.
586, 123 N.W. 1045, aff'd 228 U.S. 70 (1912).
The sentence above quoted was intended to express
a prohibition; it provides '; ... no branch bank shall be
established ... " in a particular place. I_f that particular
place was where a branch bank was located, the term
"branch bank" would have been used to describe that
place. Instead, the legislature said "no branch bank
shall be established in any city or town in which is
located a bank ... " obviously intending to distinguish
the latter term, "bank," from the term "branch bank"
5
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it previously used. Had the legislature intended to in•
clude within the prohibition a place where a branch
bank was located, it would have inserted words to make
that portion of the sentence read, " ... no branch bank
shall be established in any city or town in which is
located a bank or branch_, . . . " The legislature could
have inserted those words, but did not.
In striving to ascertain the legislative intent, the
court must look to the entire statute and its use of terms
throughout. Christensen v. Slawter_, 173 Cal. App. 2d
325, 343 P.2d 341 (1959). From a reading of the whole
of section 7-3-6, it is clear that the term "bank" when
used unconnected with the word "branch" means a unit
bank. Thus in the first paragraph of the section the
language "the business of every bank shall be conducted
only at its banking house ... " must refer to a unit bank
and not to a branch. In the second paragraph the
language " ... any bank having a paid-in capital and
surplus of not less than $60,000 may establish and
operate one branch ... " must refer to a unit bank and
not to a branch. In the third paragraph, where the intent
was to include both unit banks and branches, the legislature used the language, "All banking houses and
branches . . . " In the seventh paragraph, the term
"branch" was used four times to distinguish a branch
bank from a unit bank designated "bank." In the eighth
paragraph, the legislature said, "No branch shall be
established at a location outside the corporate limits
of a city or town in such close proximity to an established bank or branch as to unreasonably interfere with

6
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the business thereof.'' If the legislature had not intended
a distinction it would have needed only to use the word
"bank."
The conclusion is unavoidable that the legislature
intended the word "bank" to mean unit bank.
This interpretation was adopted by the Attorney
General in advising the Bank Commissioner in the
administration of the statute. In 1956, he was asked by
the Bank Commissioner, "May more than one branch
bank be established in a city of the third class, when no
unit bank is there in existence?" In an opinion dated
December 20, 1956, No. 56-142, the Attorney General
ruled:
"It is our opinion that the foregoing provision
would not prevent the establishment of more
than one branch bank in a city of the third class,
if a unit bank is not there located. We base our
result upon an interpretation of the word 'bank'
or 'banks' as used in that section, concluding that
such word is synonymous with a 'unit bank' and
does not include a branch thereof.
"In addition to the provision noted, Section
7-3-6 in several instances, uses the term 'bank'

to connote an institution, separate and distinct
from, and not inclusive of, a 'branch.' For example:
''Vith the consent of the bank commissioner
and the approval of the governor, any bank
having a paid-in capital and surplus of not less
than $60,000 may establish and operate one
branch for the transaction of its business; provided, that for each additional branch estab-

7
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lished there shall be paid in an additional
$60,000 (capital and surplus).

* * *

"A n.lJ bank desiring to establish one or more
branches or offices shall file a written application therefor in such form and containing such
information as the bank commissioner may
require.

* * *

"No branch shall be established at a location
outside the corporate limits of a city or town
in such close proximity to an established bank
or branch as to unreasonably interfere with the
business thereof.' (Emphasis added.)
"In addition to the foregoing use of the word
bank and branch in the disjunctive, the very
definition of the term 'branch' sustains our conclusion. Section 7-3-6 defines branch as follows:
'The term 'branch' as used in this act shall
be held to include any branch bank, branch
office, branch agency, additional office, or any
branch place of business at which deposits are
received or checks paid or money lent.'
"Certain policy considerations are also persuasive. First, there is no limitation on the number
of unit banks that may be established in a third
class city as long as the establishment does not
unreasonably interfere with an established business, and the Banking Commissioner gives the
necessary approval of the Articles of Incorporation pursuant to Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953.
Similarly, there is no legal limitation on the number of branches that might be established in the
type municipality under consideration if an existing bank of five years' operation is acquired by
another banking institution for the purpose of

8
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establishing a branch. See Section 7-3-6, U.C ..A_.
1953, as amended. It would therefore appear
that the Legislature did not consider the presence of more than one branch in a city of the
third class inherently against public interest, nor
disadvantageous to the competing banking
branch per se.
"Second, if Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, is so construed that only one branch
will be permitted in an incorporated area other
than a city of the first class, even though no unit
bank has been established, then it is conceivable
that such municipality might reach a population
growth, which one branch could not efficiently
handle, and adequate service could only result
when a unit bank was established or the city
became one of the first class and additional
branches were permitted. Such a construction
would seem contrary to legislative intent.
"Third, in our opinion the establishment of
branch banks is justified on the theory that public
advantage will be subserved if a banking institution creates additional offices or agencies for its
existing customers, and thus provides more convenient and efficient service. When a unit bank
has been established in a city of the third class,
it presumably can service the needs of the municipal residents, and there would not be sufficient
reason to permit a branch to compete with the
established unit, the presence of the former interfering with the latter. Hence the statutory prohibition in Section 7-3-6. It is conceivable that
two branches could under certain facts be justified in a third class city, sans a unit bank, on the
theory that each was to service existing customers
of the parent banks in other locations."

9
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The interpretation urged by the defendants is not
only consistent with the statutory language and the
legislative scheme of bank regulation, but it is the interpretation followed by the Bank Com1nissioner and the
Comptroller of the Currency in their administration of
the statute.
Administrative interpretation of a statute does not
aYail to overcome a statute so plain in its command as
to leave nothing for construction, but consistent administrative practice continuing unchallenged for Inany
years may not be overturned even if the scope of the
statutory command is indefinite or doubtful. Norwegian
Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. U.S.~ 228 U.S. 294, 313 (1932).
Under the provision of Title 7 of the Utah Code,
the Bank Commissioner is charged with the administration of the banking laws of the state. He is expressly
vested with authority to administer the regulations as
to branches in the granting of permits to establish
them. Similarly, the Comptroller of the Currency is
bound by the provisions of the Utah law in granting
permits to national banks to establish branches in Utah.
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) provides in part:
"A national banking association may, with the
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency,
establish and operate new branches: (I) within
the limits of the city, town or village in which
said association is situated, if such establishment
and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the laws of the State in
question; and (2) at any point within the State
in which said association is situated, if such estab10
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lishment and operation are at the time authorized
to State banks by the statute law of the State in
question by language specifically granting such
authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the
State of State banks."
Both public officials have consistently followed the
interpretation of 7-3-6 upon which defendant State
Bank of Provo here relies. It is noted in paragraph 9
and 10 of the stipulation:
" ... On or about November 9, 1961, the Bank
Commissioner authorized the establishment of
a branch of the Beehive State Bank in the City
of Tooele, not a city of the first class, at a time
when a branch of First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., was regularly transacting a customary
banking business in said city.
"10. The Comptroller of the Currency granted
an application of First Security Bank of Utah,
N .A., in the year 1955, for the establishment of
a branch by it in Murray City, not a city of the
first class, at a time when a branch of Walker
Bank & Trust Company was regularly transacting a customary banking business in said City
and said Comptroller of the Currency granted
an application of First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A., in the year 1957 for the establishment of
a branch by it in South Ogden, not a city of the
first class, at a time when a branch of Commercial
Security Bank and a branch of Bank of Utah
were regularly transacting a customary banking
business in South Ogden. On January 21, 1963,
the Comptroller of the Currency granted authority to the First National Bank of Logan to
11
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establish a branch bank in Logan, not a city of
the first class. At the time when said authority
was granted, a branch of plaintiff lValker Bank
& Trust Company and a branch of First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A., were regularly transacting
a customary banking business in Logan."
We have already adverted to the opinion of the
Attorney General supporting the interpretation followed by the Bank Commissioner and the Comptroller.
This interpretation of the Attorney General adds weight
to that of the administrative officers. In a similar situation, the 'Vyoming Supreme Court, in upholding the
ad1ninistrative interpretation of a sales tax provision
against that of a taxpayer, stated:
"This construction of the law which has received the approval of at least two of the chief
law officers of the state has been followed by the
board as the department of the state government
charged with the duty of administering the Act.
... Four sessions of the legislature of the state
have occurred since the construction of the law
above announced was transmitted to and followed by the Board and no subsequent statute
has been enacted which in anywise interferes with
the views thus presented so far as we are informed." Walgren Co. v. State Board of Equalization~ 62 Wyo. 297, 166 P.2d 960, 963 {1946).
A California court recently took the same view:
"Consistent administrative construction of a
statute over many years, particularly when it
originated with those charged with putting the
statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to
great weight and will not be overturned unless
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clearly erroneous." DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v.
Dept. of Employment~ 56 Cal. 2d 62, 362 P.2d
487, 491 (1961).
In State Bank of l(enmore v. Bell~ 197 Misc. 97,
96 N.Y. 2d 851 (1950), the defendant, Banking Board,
approved the application of Marine Trust Co. to open
and occupy a branch bank in the town of Tonawanda,
New York. The plaintiff, which had its principal place
of business in that town brought an action to review
the determination made by the defendant. Plaintiff
cited numerous items of error and illegality in defendant's action, among them that defendant had misinterpreted the law in that Tonawanda was unincorporated
and the law did not permit branch banks to be established in such villages. In dismissing the plaintiff's petition the court said that some fourteen branch banks had
been authorized and opened in unincorporated villages
in New York since the law was amended in 1934 to
permit branch banking. The court held that if the law
contained an ambiguity such practical construction of
the statute by those charged with the duty of its application and enforcement over such an extended period
of time could not be ignored.
Our statute here is not even ambiguous!
Other cases holding that administrative interpretation of a statute should be upheld or that legislative
acquiescence for such interpretation may be inferred
from its silence over a period of years are: Oliver v.
Spitz~ 76 Nev. 5, 348 P.2d 158 (1960); State v. Dept.
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of Transportation of Washington, 33 'Vash. 2d 448,
206 P.2d 456, 477 (1949); State ex rel York v. Board
of Commissioners~ 28 Wash. 2d 891, 184 P.2d 577, 590
(1947); G1dllot v. State Highway Comm. of Montana~
102 Mont. 157, 56 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1936); F.11.C. v.
Bunte Brothers~ Inc.~ 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1940); U.S.
v. American Trucking Assoc.~ 310 U.S. 534, 549
(1939).
Section 7-3-6 has been amended and re-enacted in
1953, 1957 and 1963 without material change in the
sentence under consideration. In light of its consistent
and notorious administrative interpretation by both state
and national supervisory agencies, it must be concluded
that the legislature has, at the very least, acquiesced
therein.
The doctrine of re-enactment has long been recognized by the courts. As early as 1908 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the re-enactment by Congress without change of a statute which had previously
received long continued executive construction was ~
adoption by Congress of such a construction. U.S. v.
Cerecado Hermanos~ 209 U.S. 337 (1908).
The doctrine has been generally applied in state
as well as federal courts to all fields of administrative
action, whether formalized by regulations or merely recognized in an administrative function and decision. Thus
the Supreme Court of Michigan ~aid it was the well
settled general rule that legislative re-enactment after
such interpretation, "which must be presumed to have
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been known to the legislature," carried with it the sanction of legislative approval of such conclusions, Chrysler
Corp. t,. Smith> 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87, 135 A.L.R.
900, 907 ( 1941). Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court
said it was a very well established rule that where a
statute of doubtful construction has been construed by
executive officers of the state charged with its execution,
and it has subsequently been re-enacted without substantial change of language, it will continue to receive
the same construction. Stanford v. Butler~ 142 Texas
692, 181 SW2d 269, 153 A.L.R. 1054, 1063 ( 194.,t).
Even while declaring void an administrative rule based
upon a statute which had subsequently been re-enacted,
the California Supreme Court took great care to point
out that the administrative construction of long standing
could only be overturned after a finding that the statute
involved was clear, unambiguous and required no amplification in its original writing. Whitcomb Hotel v.
California Employment Commission~ 24 Cal.2d. 753,
151 P.2d 233, 236 (1944).
The defendants submit that the language in dispute, having been interpreted consistently by the official
charged with its administration over a period of years,
and having been enacted and re-enacted unchanged by
the legislature with knowledge of that interpretation,
should be construed by this court in accordance with that
administrative interpretation.
The 1963 legislature had before it amendments to
the banking laws, including 7-3-6, and re-enacted the
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sentence under consideration without change. If there
was any doubt as to the correctness of the interpretation
of the Attorney General and the Bank Cmnmissioner,
of the State of Utah, as well as that of the Comptroller,
particularly in view of the pendency of this action, corrective action could have been taken by the legislature.
None was. Its action in re-enacting 7-3-6 without a1nending this sentence must be considered as a particular
re-affirmation of the interpretation under which the
administrative agencies have proceded.
B. PLAINTIFF'S OFFICE IN PROVO
IS A BRANCH AND PLAINTIFF'S METHOD OF ACQUISITION OF THAT BRANCH
GIVES IT NO SPECIAL STANDING TO
CONTEST DEFENDANT'S BRANCH.
Plaintiff argued below: ( 1) That a bank is a bank
no matter how many offices it has and, alternatively,
(2) that plaintiff's Provo branch, because it was
acquired by a rnerger, has somehow retained some characteristics of a unit bank-at least sufficient characteristics to prevent defendant from establishing its Brigham
Young University branch.
It is submitted that neither of these arguments is
sound.
Section 7-3-6 provides at the outset:
''The business of every bank shall be conducted only at its banking house and every bank
shall receive deposits and pay checks only at its
16
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banking house except
(Emphasis supplied.)

a.Y

hereinafter provided.n

The section then goes on to authorize the establishment
of branches under certain circumstances and sets forth
the procedure to be followed in obtaining authorization
frmn the Bank Commissioner to do so.
In 1911 the predecessor to this section was enacted.
Chapter 25, Section 32, Laws of Utah, 1911, provides:
"The business of every banking institution
shall be conducted only at its banking house, and
no bank in this State or any loan, trust or guaranty company or trust company conducting a
banking business, or any officer, director or agent
thereof, shall open, establish or maintain any
branch bank or office, and shall receive deposits
and pay checks only at its banking house."
In 1933, the section was amended so that the first
sentence of the statute enacted in 1911 read as it does
today. That brief history makes it clear that from 1911
to 1933 a bank could have only one office-at its banking house. Since the adoption in 1933 of the provision,
"except as hereinafter provided" and the thereafter
provision of section 7-3-6 authorizing the establishment
of branches, a bank may establish other offices branches- if the statutory conditions are met and the
statutory procedures are followed.
One of the authorized statutory procedures to
establish a branch is for a bank to acquire another bank
by purchase or merger. That is the procedure followed
by the plaintiff Walker Bank & Trust Company in
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establishing its branch office in Provo. 'Valker Bank
has only one banking house-Second South and Main
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. It has thirteen branches
elsewhere. One of these is in Provo. But its branch
there does not mean plaintiff is located in Provo. Michigan National Bank v. Gidney_, 237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.
(1956).

'Ve do not contend that plaintiff's Provo branch
is a different and separate entity in Provo. We do contend that its office in Provo is a "branch" as defined
in the statute. Section 7-3-6 states:
"The term 'branch' as used in this act shall
be held to include any branch bank, branch office,
branch agency, additional office, or any branch
place of business at which deposits are received
or checks paid or money lent."
Inasmuch as Walker Bank & Trust Company's office
in Provo and that of First Security are "branches" as
distinguished from "banks" as the terms are used and
defined in section 7-3-6, their existence does not preclude
defendant State Bank of Provo from establishing its
branch in Provo.
Plaintiff's alternative argument is that, somehow,
because its Provo branch was acquired by merger with
the Farmers' and Merchants' bank, the result is an
hermaphrodite animal-a branch with a unit bank's
special protections and requirements. It is submitted
that Utah law recognizes no such species and that the
merging parties cannot create one by contract. Nor did
they. The stipulated record here shows:

18
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(a) The merger agreement provides \V alker Bank
& Trust Cmnpany is the surviving corporation (Para.
:! of the merger agreement) ;
(b) \Valker Bank & Trust Company's office in
ProYo is designated as "Walker Bank & Trust Company, Farmers' and Merchants' Branch" (Para. 7 and 9
of the 1nerger agreement);
(c) The separate corporate existence of Farmers'
and Merchants' Bank ceased with the effective date of
the merger (Para. 10 of the merger agreement) ;
(d) The merger agreement provides the principal
office of the surviving corporation shall be located in
Salt Lake County (Para. 19 of the merger agreement);
(e) By letter dated October 24, 1955, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System approved
the establishment of a branch by Walker Bank & Trust
Company at Nine North Third West Streets in Provo,
Utah.
Plaintiff also argued that section 7-6-7, U.C.A.
1953 gives plaintiff Walker Bank & Trust Company
"the right to protect its [Farmers and Merchants'
Bank] status and competitive situation" inasmuch as
"Such rights survive the statutory merger of Farmers'
and Merchants' Bank with and into plaintiff." Plaintiff
misconstrues the purpose of the section of the statute
it cites. It is a part of chapter 6 of Title 7 dealing with
mergers, consolidations, and conversions of banks. Conversion is a change of a bank from a state to a national
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charter or vice versa (section 7-6-1 (3} U.C.A. 1953}.
In dealing both with the "resulting bank" from a
n1erger and the "converting bank" from a conversion,
the legislature provided that the surviving bank should
have "all the rights, powers and duties" and the use of
the name of its predecessor. See section 7-6-7, A, B
and C and section 7-6-8, C and D. For both cases the
statutory purpose is obvious. Banks hold a plethora of
legal papers-negotiable instruments of every nature,
mortgages, pledges, assignments, etc. The statutory
provisions are to make clear that the surviving entity
succeeds to all of these rights and powers without the
necessity of execution of a multitude of documents of
transfer or the recording of assignments of numerous
mortgages; cf. 12 U.S.C. 214 (b) dealing with the
statute of a national bank converted to a state bank.
Plaintiff's contention also does violence to the clear
purpose of the provisions of section 7-3-6 dealing with
the establishment of branches and the protection of
unit banks, not branch banking systems. It would
indeed be subverting the legislative intent to find that
a unit bank disappears upon merger into a branch bank
system, but sufficient me1nory lingers on with the surYivor to make the branch a unit bank when it serves the
system's purpose.
Section 7-6-7 refers to "rights, powers and duties."
Can the protective provisions of 7-3-6 for unit banks
be a "right" or "power" which Walker Bank may waive
when First Security established a branch in Murray, but
20
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which it may exercise in Provo when defendant State
Bank of Provo does likewise? Union Trust Co. v. Simrnons~ 211 P.2d 190 would say not.
Far from being irrelevant, the facts in Murray
and Provo are parallel and pertinent. Walker's branch
there was acquired by merger. The Comptroller of the
Currency, required by federal statute, 12 U.S.C. § 36
(c), to conform to state law in the granting of branches
outside the home city, in 1955 granted a permit to First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., to establish a branch
in l\Iurray at a ti1ne when plaintiff's branch office in
~Iurray was regularly transacting customary banking
business in said City. If plaintiff had a "right" to exclude branches by virtue of the provision of section 7-6-7
U.C.A. 1953, it had one in Murray in 1955. It did
nothing.
The statutory purpose is made clear by referring
to another section in chapter 7, section 7-6-6. That section provides that when the merger becomes effective,
"The charters of the constituent banks, other
than the resulting bank, shall thereupon be
deemed surrendered.''
Thus no charter exists for the Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank. The only charter existent is to the Walker Bank
& Trust Company, with its principal office in Salt Lake
County and with the right to operate a branch in Provo.
That surviving entity has the "right" and "power" to
engage in the banking business through its Provo
branch office and such other branches as it may be per-
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mitted to establish or acquire, but it holds no charter
to operate as a unit bank in Provo. That latter right
expired with the surrender of the charter of Farmers'
and Merchants' Bank.
Finally plaintiff's contention that the Farmers'
and Merchants' Bank has some sort of special identity
proceeds on the false premise that plaintiff transacts
business as a different and separate entity in Provo and
overlooks the difference between banks and branches.
The \V alker Bank & Trust Company is one legal entity.
It has thirteen offices, one of which is in Provo. Its principal office is in Salt Lake City. It has but one Board
of Directors. There is no Board of Directors assigned
to the Farmers' and Merchants' Bank. Its loan limits
as specified in section 7-3-39 of Utah Code Annotated
are governed by its entire capital and surplus, not by
any allocation of capital and surplus to each individual
office. There are no stockholders in the Farmers' and ·
Merchants' branch. There are only stockholders of the
"'\Valker Bank & Trust Company. There are no reserve
requirements for the Farmers' and Merchants' branch.
There are only reserve requirements for the "\Valker
Bank & Trust Company.
"'\Vhen plaintiff merged with the Farmers' and
Merchants' Bank, it acquired a branch in Provo. It
did not acquire any special right to preclude its local
competitor from better serving its customers.

22
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II.
SECTION 7-3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE STATE
BANK OF PROVO FROM ESTABLISHING A
BRANCH BANK IN ITS O'VN COMMUNITY.
Plaintiff's second argument is based, not on the fact
that plaintiff has a branch in Provo and the prese·nce
of that branch precludes defendant from establishing
a branch in Provo, but on the fact that defendant itself
is there. This anomaly is based on a literal reading of
the following sentence from section 7-3-6 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953:
"Except in cities of the first class, or within
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall
be established in any city or town in which is
located a bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking business,
unless the bank seeking to establish such branch
shall take over an existing bank."
Plaintiff's argument is that the defendant State Bank
of Provo is regularly transacting a customary banking
business in Provo. Since that is so, plaintiff contends,
under the literal language of the statute, defendant
cannot establish a branch in Provo because it is there
itself.
Plaintiff's attempt to ride defendant's coat tails in
order to limit defendant's efforts better to serve its
customers in the very community defendant was chartered by the state to serve, raises two basic questions.
23
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( 1) Can the plaintiff assert defendant's presence in
Provo as a basis for standing to sue when the statute
on which it relies is obviously designed to protect local
banks and not plaintiff? and ( 2) Is the absurd result
of plaintiff's literal reading of one sentence of 7-3-6
in accord with the legislative intent in the regulation
of branch banking in Utah? It is defendant's position
that both questions must be answered in the negative.

A. The restriction expressed in section 7-3-6 as
to the location of branch banks refers only to cities or
towns other than one in which the principal banking
house of the bank concerned is located.
From 1911, (Ch. 25, § 32, Laws of Utah, 1911),
until 1933, branch banking was expressly prohibited in
Utah. In 1933, the legislature expressly authorized
banks possessing the requisite capital and surplus to
establish, with the consent of the bank commissioner and
the governor, one or more branches (Ch. 6, Laws of
Utah, 1933) . After making this general grant of authority, the 1933 enactment contained this restrictive proVISion:

"No branch bank shall be established in any
city, town or village in which is located a bank
or banks, state or national regularly transacting
a customary banking business, unless the bank
seeking to establish such branch shall take over
an existing bank or obtain the consent of all
banks therein located, except that in cities of the
first class, branches may be established without
such consent."
It is clear, from a review of the language of the
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entire section as a whole and the statutory history and
purpose of the regulation of branch banking, that this
limitation was not intended to restrict branching activities of banks in the city in which their principal office is
located. The legislature did intend to protect banks in
the smaller cities and towns, other than Salt Lake City,
from the undue competition of branches of larger banks
whose principal banking house was located elsewhere.
This court has held that the restriction was not
intended to apply to Salt Lake City. Mr. Justice 'Vade
in a concurring opinion in Union Trust Company v.
Si,mmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949), after
quoting the above sentence from the 1933 enactment,
stated:
"By the above emphasized provision [Mr.
Justice Wade referred to the words "except that
in cities of the first class, branches may be established without such consent"] the legislature intended to allow the establishment of a branch
bank in cities of the first class not only as expressly therein provided, without obtaining the
consent of all banks therein located, but also without taking over an existing bank. Otherwise, that
provision would not alter the meaning of that
section at all, for under the provision which
applies to cities, towns and villages other than
cities of the first class, without the aid of such an
exception a branch bank may be established without the consent of the local banks by taking over
an existing bank." 211 P.2d 190, 194.
Chief Justice Pratt in the opinion of the court in the
same case reached the same conclusion. He stated:
25
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"The part of the statute first quoted above,
establishes two methods of establishing a branch
bank, compliance with either of which will make
it possible for the bank commissioner to determine
the issue of convenience and advantage in other
than cities of the first class. (Emphasis supplied.)
211 P.2d 190, 193.
This court's interpretation that the restriction did not
apply to branches established in Salt Lake City was
ratified by the legislature in 1951 ( Ch. 10, Laws of
Utah, 1951), when it amended the sentence to delete
the consent provision found unconstitutional by this
court in Union Trust Company v. Simmons~ supra~ and
moved the "except" clause from the end to the beginning of the sentence. There is nothing in the 1951 amendment or the 1953 amendment ( Ch. 8, § 4, Laws of Utah,
1953), which added unincorporated areas of Salt Lake
County to the exception, to indicate that the legislature
intended any greater restriction on cities and towns
other than Salt Lake City than was originally provided in the 1933 enactment.
The same principles of statutory interpretation and
the same reasoning used by this court in arriving at the
legislative intent in Union Trust Company v. Simmons~
supra~ make it equally clear that the "take-over" restriction on the general grant of authority to establish
branch banks does not apply to a bank having its principal banking house located in the same city, town or
village where it proposes to establish a branch office in
order to better serve the credit needs of the community
for which it was originally chartered.
26
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A page of history from the parallel development of
national banking legislation establishes the genesis of
the distinction between branches located in the same
city, town or village in which the head office is located
and branches located elsewhere. Following the financial
panic of 1907 a nmnber of states, led by California, began to authorize branch banking. By 1927 branch banking was permitted, with minor modifications, in seventeen states. No authority was given to national banks to
establish branches, but in 1922, the Comptroller of the
Currency ruled that national banks could open additional "teller windows" in their home cities. These additional intracity offices in some instances became "great
tall buildings, expensive. structures", 68 Cong. Rec.
2179. This device was thwarted by the Supreme Court
in First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri~ 263
U.S. 640 (1923), which held that such offices were unlawful in states where branch banking was prohibited by
state law.
This ruling intensified a battle in Congress between
advocates of branching and its opponents over legislation to authorize branches for national banks and state
chartered banks which were members of the Federal
Reserve System. Typical of the opponent's position
was the statement by Representative Cannon:
"The principle of branch banking when
allowed to develop unhampered establishes a
monopoly. It creates a gigantic banking octopus,
with branches extending like tentacles from the
larger cities out to the smaller towns, throttling
local banks and sucking out of the country and
27
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into the city the deposits and resources which
should be available for local enterprises ....
"There can be no comparison of the relative
1nerits of the branch bank and the home-owned
bank in their influence upon a community and its
prosperity. The home bank, owned by local businessmen, has at heart the interest of the town
and seeks to build up the community and contribute to its prosperity. The branch bank is
owned by outsiders, who have no pride in local
affairs and who seek only profits and dividends.
The hmne bank pays its taxes at home and contributes to home institutions and enterprises and
its stockholders spend their earnings at home.
The branch bank pays the bulk of its taxes in
other States and municipalities. It makes little
or no contribution for local purposes, and its
dividends are drawn from the town in which
they are made and spent in distant cities. The
home bank is controlled and managed by local
boards of directors, the purest form of local selfgovernment, while the branch banks are controlled by professional financiers, with little understanding and less sympathy for the needs and
problems of their customers, and is, in short, a
species of carpetbag government. The home bank
means home control, independent and cooperative. The branch bank typifies the overlordship
of great money monopolies centered in alien
territory, to which the patrons of every branch
bank pay tribute as truly as the countrymen of
the Nazarene paid tribute to Caesar in the golden
age of the Roman Empire." 67 Cong. Rec. 3248.
It is obvious, frmn his remarks, and that of others,
of similar tenor, that what Congress was worried about
was the invasion by large banking chains from outside
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cities into the smaller communities. The resulting legislation was a compromise known as the McFadden Act
(Act of February 25, 1927, c. 191 §7, 44 Stat. 1228).
This act authorized branches of national banks "within
the limits of the city, town or village" in which the bank
'vas located. The reasoning behind this measure was
expressed by the Comptroller of the Currency, H. M.
Dawes, in his testimony before the House Banking and
Currency Committee reproduced at 65 Cong. Rec.
11297.

"At the outset it should be stated that while
the question of extending outside facilities in the
form of offices or branches beyond the limits
of the parent institution but confined to muncipal
limits is one that might be properly controversial,
it does not, to my mind, involve the fundamental
principle of branch banking. So long as such an
operation is confined strictly to municipal limits,
it remains in its essence a community operation
conducted for the benefit of residents by
residents.
"I will not discuss the necessity or develop the
arguments which have induced State legislatures
to permit this form of operation. It seems to me
it is sufficient to say that these intracity activities
do not run parallel at all to the operations which
are involved in the extension of banking influence
by direct control in the form of branches covering
a whole State or limits beyond the municipality.
If the principle of local control over banking
facilities within city limits is recognized and such
an operation is forbidden in one and permitted
in another State, it would not be a real concession
to any branch banking principle, since intracity
banking is, after all, community banking as dis-
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tinguished from State, district or national branch
banking." 65 Cong. Rec. 11297.
Mr. McFadden, the sponsor of the 1927 enactment,
in support of the measure in the House stated:
"Both sections enunciate the same policy and
set up within the Federal reserve system the same
standard of banking. They are based upon the
assumption that state-wide branch banking is
unsound and puts our whole banking system in
danger. To those who believe as I do, state-wide
branch banking will eventually lead to Inonopolistic control over the credit facilities of an
entire State and will, in the course of time, run
out of business all of the rural unit banks, both
state and national. "\Vhen a branch banking system becomes fully developed in any given State
the business and industrial activities outside of
the large cities will be at the mercy of a few
large city banks. This is what former Comptroller
Dawes called 'absentee banking'." 67 Cong. Rec.
2832.

Then came the banking crisis of the early thirties which
prompted the Banking Act of 1933 in the Congress
and 1933 amendments to the Utah Banking Laws by
the Utah legislature. Both looked to statewide branching as a means of ameliorating the distress in communities where the only bank had failed or acquisition
by a larger bank with substantial capital and resources
was the only means of saving the smaller banks in
financial difficulties. 1
!Comptroller Dawes reported in 1930 that 88 per cent of bank
failures were in banks having less than $100,000 capital and 80
per cent were in towns having a population of 2,500 or less. 130
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 3981.
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The Congress had two alternative suggestions before it in considering limitations on branch banking outside the home community. Senator Vandenburg proposed to limit branches outside the home community
of the bank with this proviso:
"Except in a city, town, or village where there
is no National or State bank regularly transacting customary banking business, no such association shall establish a branch except by taking
over a unit bank existing at the time of the enactment hereof or an affiliate of such association."
76 Cong. Rec. 2026.
The other alternative, proposed by Senator Bratton,
was adopted by the Congress and limited branches outside the home community to:
". . . the restrictions as to location imposed by
the law of the state on state banks." Section 23
of Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. 36 (c).
The 1933 Utah legislature did in one enactment
what Congress had done, in 1927 and 1933, in two. It
authorized statewide branch banking. In so doing it
recognized the need to permit branching in the communities which had never been able to support a unit
bank or into a community where a unit bank had failed,
leaving a void. But it also saw the need to protect unit
banks from the undue competition of large banking
chains. It sought to protect the state from additional
unit bank failures in the smaller towns which might
very well be caused by destructive competition from
outside banking chain operations. It did so by pro31
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hibiting branching by outside banks if there were a bank
already in the community, unless the existing bank or
banks consented. It had no need to insert a special
authorization for intracity branches, as Congress had
done in 1927 because in the very same act the legislature
authorized branch banking generally. Thus the thrust
of the restriction adopted in 1933 was directed at the
perils which Congressman Cannon outlined to the Congress as far back as 1927-the invasion of the smaller
communities by the large banking chains and absentee
ownership. The legislature was not concerned with
intracity branching as such and considered it amply
covered by the blanket authorization of branch banking
contained in the first paragraph of the 1933 enactment.
The reason for this distinction between outside
branches and intracity banking, recognized by both the
Congress and the Utah legislature is obvious. Establishing another office or branch in the same city, town or
village where the principal banking house is located
is merely an effort to meet more effectively the needs
of existing customers. It is not an effort by the bank
to expand its operation to a different area or to enter
into competition with others. Bank regulators had
found that one of the principal causes of failures of
rural banks in particular was the existence of too many
banks. Hearings before House Committee on Banks
and Commerce, 71 Cong. 2d Sess., p. 141.
Such problems are not applicable to branches or
additional offices of a bank in its home town. Take for
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example, the very situation in Provo. Obviously the
Bank Commissioner in approving the defendant State
Bank of Provo's application for a branch found a need
for additional banking services on or near the Brigham
Young University campus which has grown substantially in recent years in the number of students, faculty
and employees. One need only look at the branch of
plaintiff 'Valker Bank & Trust Company, located near
the University of Utah campus in the same city as its
principal office, to recognize the need for banks better
to serve its community where the demands of expanding
population evidence such a need. Yet plaintiff would
contend that the only banking facility that the legislature would permit Brigham Young University to have
would be a new unit bank. One needs but a rudimentary
acquaintance with banking economics to recognize that
banking needs sufficient to support a branch might fall
far short of supporting a unit bank. The legislature
recognized this in its statutory scheme by allowing
branch offices to be established. What plaintiff really
contends is that since it cannot have a Brigham Young
University branch, as it has a University of Utah
branch, no one else should be permitted to have one.
The situation in Davis County also illustrates the
reason for the distinction between branches of outside
banks and branches of banks located in the community.
Davis County has enjoyed a phenomenal growth in the
past decade. In each city and town in Davis County
there exists an independent unit bank. Would the legislature have intended that these existing banks could
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not expand their facilities to meet the needs of their
communities created by that growth? The interpretation
of the statute followed by the Bank Commissioner, the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Attorney General
would allow such flexibility to meet the change in economic conditions without the necessity of chartering
new unit banks. It is only by reading with blinders just
one sentence extracted from the entire banking code
that one reaches the literal restriction upon which plaintiff here relies. One would seriously doubt that the legislature would have intended its regulatory scheme to be
so subverted, when by the very framework of the regulation of branch banking, it was seeking to protect the
integrity of existing unit banks.
Let us turn to the language of the sentence on
which plaintiff relies. Under the alternative methods
provided by the 1933 wording of the restrictive language, the defendant State Bank of Provo, as the only
bank in Provo, could not take over itself, and to ask
itself for permission would be equally absurd. Quite
clearly, these methods have no application to the only
bank in a locality. However, applied to a bank located
outside of Provo, which sought to establish a branch
in Provo, the statutory restriction has meaning and
purpose-the protection of small local banks from the
competitive advantages of a large chain, such as is
plaintiff. Applied literally, as plaintiff would haYe it,
to a bank located in Provo or any of the other smaller
communities, the statute would have the anomalous
result that no branches could be established in smaller
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communities, unless an established independent unit
bank were taken over by a larger bank. That result is
diametrically opposed to the whole scheme of the regulation of branch banking - protection against the
monopolistic tendency of large chain operations.
This court has never been so wedded to the literal
reading of a statute as to reach a construction as plaintiff here contends. As this court noted in Johanson v.
Cudahy Packing Co ... 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98
(1944):
"By so holding we are cognizant of the fact
that we are not following the literal wording of
the statute, but such is not required when to do
so would defeat legislative i~tent and make the
statute absurd." p. 108.
It is submitted that the literal wording of the statute
on which plaintiff here relies would defeat the legislative
intent and 1nake the statute absurd by holding that the
only way a branch bank could be established in a city
other than Salt Lake City would be for a larger outside bank to take over the existing independent unit
bank, rather than allowing the existing independent
unit bank, as here contended, itself to establish a branch
better to serve the needs of the community for which it
was first chartered by the State Banking Department.
As Mr. Justice Wolfe in Norville v. State Tax Commission~ 98 Utah 120, 97 P.2d 937 at 939 (1940), quoted
with approval Sutherland on Statutory Construction,
section 241 at 320:

"In the exposition of a statute the intention of
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the law-maker will prevail over the literal sense
of the terms; and its reason and intention will
prevail over the strict letter. When the words
are not explicit the intention is to be collected
from the context; from the occasion and necessity
of the law; from the mischief felt, and the remedy
in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason
and good discretion."
The interpretation, which defendants here submit
is consonant with the legislative intent and with reason
and good discretion, does not require this court to add
words to the statute or to overlook words in the statute,
but merely to construe the restriction which the legislature originally adopted in 1933 to apply only to
branches established in a city, town or village other
than in the city, town or village in which the bank seeking to establish such a branch is located. In other words,
whenever a sn1all independent unit bank in Provo,
Logan, Clearfield, Brigham City, etc., can demonstrate
to the Bank Commissioner that the _public convenience
and advantage will be subserved and promoted by the
establishment of an additional office to serve its customers in its own community, that is all that is required.
If '""alker Bank and Trust Company or some other
larger bank desires to invade one of these smaller communities to acquire for itself some of the business which
an existing bank or banks enjoy in the regular transaction of their customary banking business in such
community, such outside bank may not do so unless it
takes over the existing bank. Thus the existing bank
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is protected from the undue competition which the substantially greater resources of the invading bank could
employ. At the same time, under this interpretation,
the public in these smaller communities are guaranteed
that their banking needs and conveniences will be subserved and promoted in that their existing banking
facilities may be expanded by the addition of drive-ins
and other offices in convenient locations as their own
community expands.
That the legislature intended to protect local banking from outside competition is further evidenced by
the language which first appeared in the 1933 provision
to the effect that no unit bank may be permitted to be
acquired by another bank for the purpose of establishing a branch unless such bank shall be in operation
for a period of five years. The purpose of this is obvious
-to prevent the large banks from establishing nominally independent unit banks in the towns where they
cannot establish branches and then to acquire them and
to make them branches by merger.
Under the interpretation which the Bank Commissioner has adopted in the granting of defendant its
branch in Provo, and the Comptroller of the Currency
has followed in granting a branch to the First National
Bank in Logan, the regulation of branch banking by
the legislature, since 1933 and through all the subsequent amendments of section 7-3-6, is consistent and
evidences a definite legislative policy.
1. Branches may be established if the applicant
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possesses requisite capital and surplus and the bank
commissioner finds that the public convenience and
advantage will be subserved and promoted.
2. There are no restrictions on branching in Salt
Lake City, and, since 1953, unincorporated areas of
Salt Lake County.

3. There are no restrictions on banks establishing
branches in their own communities.
4. In cities and towns other than Salt Lake City,
outside banks 1nay not invade such communities with
branches unless an existing independent unit bank desires to sell out.

In considering the interpretation to be given to
section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, one further
thought should be given to the construction claimed by
plaintiff that intracity branches are prohibited, except
in Salt Lake City.
Within the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and
article I, section 25 of the Utah constitution, is there
a Yalid reason for the legislature allowing "\Valker Bank
to establish a branch near the University of Utah in
Salt Lake City, but denying the only unit bank in
Provo from similarly serving its customers at Brigham
Young University or prohibiting the only unit bank in
Logan from establishing a branch to serve Utah State
University? Under the construction urged by plaintiff,
the ability of a bank to establish another branch in its
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own city-the community it was originally chartered
to serve-depends solely on the size of the city in which
it is located.
The statistics as to bank failures in the small towns
and the desire to restrain the tendency toward monopoly
which was feared might result from unrestricted statewide branch banking might be a legitimate basis for
excluding outside banks from branching in the smaller
cities and towns where unit banks are established, but
these factors hardly form a legitmate basis for precluding existing unit banks in those communities from improving their services to their customers by opening
another, more convenient office in the same community.
It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that the
court should construe a statute in such a way as to avoid
doubts as to its constitutionality. The interpretation
followed by the Bank Commissioner and urged here by
the defendants is not only consistent with the legislative
history and purpose of branch banking regulation, not
only avoids an absurd result, but also clearly avoids
·'that constitutional question. The interpretation urged
by plaintiff meets none of these tests.

B. Plaintiff does not have the standing to assert
that defendanf s presence in Provo precludes defendant
from establishing a bank there.
The action of the Bank Commissioner, of which the
plaintiff complains, is a public act done in the course
of the Bank Commissioner's official duties. Unless
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plaintiff can demonstrate that it has standing to bring
a private lawsuit challenging that action, it should be
denied relief forthwith on that basis. Plaintiff could
acquire standing either under general principles of
common law, or by a specific statutory grant. However,
there is no express provision in the banking laws of the
State of Utah, or elsewhere in the Utah Code, granting
plaintiff the right to bring a private suit to attack the
action of the Bank Commissioner. At the time this suit
was filed, section 7-1-26 of the Utah Code required
persons aggrieved by any decision or ruling of the Bank
Commissioner to appeal such decision to the State Board
of Examiners, whose decision was to be final. Plaintiff
did not do so. The 1963 Legislature amended that law
to eliminate review by the Board of Examiners and
added the following language to Section 7-1-26:
" ( 4) Any applicant for an approval of articles
of incorporation, a permit to establish a branch,
or a license to transact any business subject to
the supervision of the Banking Department or
any protestant to such application, feeling aggrieved by the act, decision or ruling of the Bank
Commissioner with respect thereto, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof by filing, within
thirty days after the decision or ruling of the
Bank Commissioner is issued, any applicable
form of action (including actions for declaratory
judgment or writs of prohibitory or mandatory
injunction) , in the District Court of the district
in which the office of the Bank Commissioner is
located. The reviewing court shall have power
to hold unlawful and set aside any act, decision
or ruling of the Bank Commissioner found to be
40
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arbitrary, capriciOus, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law." Chapter
7, Section 6, Laws of Utah, 1963.
This provision is of no aid to plaintiff for two reasons:
( 1) It was not in effect when the action was filed, and
is prospective in effect only. (2) It grants judicial
review only to a "protestant" to an "application." No
protest to the application of defendant State Bank of
Provo was filed by plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff can hardly
qualify as a "protestant."
Common law rules of standing are expressed in the
Restatement_, Torts_, Section 710, as follows:
"710. One who engages in a business or profession in violation of a legislative enactment
which prohibits persons from engaging therein,
either absolutely or without a prescribed permission, is subject to liability to another who is
engaged in the business or profession in conformity with the enactment, if, but only if,

" (a) One of the purposes of the enactment is
to protect the other against unauthorized competition, and
"(b) The enactm,ent does not negative such
liability."
Plaintiff does not qualify under the principles set forth
in section 710 of the Restatement because ( 1) section
7-3-6 of the banking law does not have as one of its
purposes the protection of the plaintiff, ( 2) the scheme
of enforcement i1nplicit in the act must be held to negative plaintiff's standing, and ( 3) the principle of section
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710 is not applicable where the defendant is operatin~
under a pennit duly granted by the proper regulatory
authority. These points will be discussed in order:
( 1) Section 7-3-6 was passed to permit branch
banking, subject to certain restrictions. Those restrictions, as we have shown, were inserted to protect banks
in small cities or towns from the harmful competition
of outside large banking chains attempting to establish
a branch in their city. The statute upon which plaintiff
relies refers to a bank located in the city where the
branch is to be established. Plaintiff is located in Salt
Lake City and only has a branch in Provo. Michigan
National Bank v. Gidney_, 237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.
1956) . Plaintiff is one of the class which may establish
a branch in Provo only by taking over an established
bank. It is not one of the class protected by the statute.
Not being within that class, it has no standing to question the establishment by defendant, a bank located in
Provo, of its branch in Provo. State ex rel Louisiana
Trust & Savings Bank v. Board of Liquidation_, 136 La.
571, 67 So. 370 (1915). As the court in Strong v. Campbell_, 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 135 (1851) noted:
''Wherever an action is brought for a breach
of duty imposed by statute, the party bringing
it must show that he had an interest in the performance of the duty, and that the duty was imposed for his benefit. But where the duty was
created or imposed for the benefit of another,
and the advantage to be derived to the party
prosecuting, by its performance, is merely incidental and no part of the design of the statute,
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no such right is created as forms the subject of
an action."
(2) The scheme of law enforcement in the banking
laws negatives plaintiff's standing to enforce its alleged
rights through a private action.

In section 7-1-1 provision is made for a state banking department, headed by a Commissioner. Section
7-1-26 gives the Commissioner discretionary power to
grant applications for licenses for the transaction of
any business subject to the provision of the banking
department. "Licenses" include the permit to establish
a branch office because:
(a) There is no provision in Title 7 giving the
Commissioner power to award "licenses" for anything
in particular-with one exception: The Commissioner
may grant a license to engage in the small loan business;
and such a license is required by anyone wishing to enter
the small loan business. But Chapter 10 of Title 7 specified the process for obtaining a license, including the
procedure for a review of the Commissioner's decision.
It is a different procedure entirely than that specified
in 7-1-26. Therefore, the term "license" in 7-1-26 cannot
refer to a license to engage in the small loan business.
(b) It is necessary for a bank to apply to the Bank
Commissioner for permission to establish a branch;
without such permission, the bank may not legally
establish such branch.
(c) The word "license" must have some meaning
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in the statute. A dictionary definition of license is "a
formal permission from the authorities to carry on a
business otherwise illegal." Therefore, it should here
be construed to include as "formal permission" to carry
on the branch banking business, otherwise illegal without such permission.
(d) If the term "license" is not construed to encompass the concept here advanced, the term is entirely
meaningless, as there is no place in the banking laws
where a "license" is expressly provided for-at least
there is no such instance which can possibly be governed by section 7-1-26.
Section 7-1-26 provides for a reasonable method
of review for a decision of the Bank Commissioner. It
specifies that "any person feeling aggrieved by the
action, decision or ruling by the Bank Commissioner
under this section may have the same reviewed by the
State Board of Examiners whose decision shall be
final.'' 1
(e) As to the violations of law by banks, not acting
pursuant to the Commissioner's permits or orders regulating them, Section 7-1-23 makes it the duty of the
Commissioner to report their actions to the county
attorney of the county in which they are located, who
shall institute proper proceedings for the enforcement
of the law. The last paragraph of Section 7-3-6 speci1The

legislature apparently concurs in this analysis. Section
7-1-26 was the section amended in 1963 to provide expressly
for judicial review of branch permits or licenses at the behest of
applicants or protestants, ch. 7, Sec. 6, 1963 Session laws.
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fically makes violation of that section a misdemeanor,
indicating that the legislature considered the police
power of the state as being the agency through which
this section would be enforced.
The statutory scheme of enforcement may be summarized as follows:
The Commissioner has discretion to regulate the
banking business in the granting of charters and licenses
or permits. His decisions in this area can be reviewed
by the State Board of Examiners, another administrative body. Only when the Board acts outside its legislative grant of authority can its decisions be challenged,
otherwise its decision is final. But if banks violate the
laws when not acting pursuant to the Commissioner's
regulation, the Bank Commissioner has a duty to report
them, and the county attorney may institute the proper
proceedings.
This scheme has adequate protections built into it
to insure that no one's interest is infringed beyond the
limit to which the legislature gave the Bank Commissioner the power to regulate those interests. But there
is no place in this scheme for private judicial action to
enforce alleged "rights," except possibly a court review
of the Board of Examiner's decision to determine
whether the Board acted pursuant to law.
Since this is a complete, self -contained system of
enforcement, it negatives the existence of an additional
private right of action- particularly where, as here,
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defendant State Bank of Provo is acting pursuant to
the authority granted by the Bank Commissioner pursuant to the statutory procedure.
In Consolidated Freightways~ Inc. v. United
Truck Lines~ Inc.~ 330 P.2d 522 (1958), the Supreme
Court of Oregon held that the Motor Carrier Act,
because it implied such a self-contained scheme of enforcement~ vested in the ICC the sole authority for
enforce1nent, and plaintiff was held to have no standing
to sue to seek private relief under the act. We contend
that that situation is substantially parallel to this case,
and that the result should be the same.
(3) The principle of Restatement~ Torts § 710 is
not applicable when defendant is operating under a
permit from the proper regulating authority.
The situation in which the principle of Section 710
applies is a situation where the defendant has acted
without securing the statutorily prescribed permit from
regulatory authority. That situation is significantly
different from the situation in the case at bar where
defendant State Bank of Provo has only done that which
the state regulatory authority has given it permission
to do. There is no basis for allowing a third party to
maintain a private action on the theory the Bank Commissioner has acted contrary to law in granting such
permit. The statutory scheme is clear that the legislature intended the legal offices of the state and review
by participants in the administrative procedure themselves to control the action of its administrative agencies.
46
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Otherwise, the courts will be cluttered with litigation by
third parties who took no part in the administrative
proceedings, but who later seek to claim some "right"
has been invaded by administrative action in which they
voiced no interest. Similar procedure is set forth in
section 54-7-16 U tab Code Annotated 1953, in dealing
with orders of the Public Utilities Commission where
only "applicants" or a "party to the proceeding" may
seek judicial review.

CONCLUSION
In summary, as we have shown in discussing the
of section 7-3-6, the pertinent provisions
of that statute are designed to protect unit banks in
cities outside Salt Lake City from invasion by larger
city banks with branch systems, i.e. the defendant State
Bank of Provo from the vast economic resources and
competitive strength of institutions with branch systems
such as plaintiff Walker Bank & Trust Company. This
case, strangely enough, presents the converse situation.
The second largest bank in the State of Utah with thirteen branches and resources in excess of $240,000,000
and a member -·of a multi-state chain having nearly
$6,000,000,000 in deposits and some 447 banking houses
located throughout the eleven Western states seeks here
to turn the legislative shield designed to protect the
smaller banks into a sword to cut off any attempt by a
small unit bank to better meet its customers' banking
needs in its own community. Instead of restricting the
inte~pretation
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monopolistic tendencies of large chain systems, plaintiff would have this court interpret the statute so as to
strangle the competitive efforts of a small independent
bank.
It is submitted that such an interpretation of the
statute would do violence to the legislative language
as well as to the legislative purpose in enacting its
regulatory scheme of branch banking. The Supreme
Court in Union Trust Co. v. Simmons_, supra_, struck
down one dog in the Inanger. Plaintiff would here ask
this court to sanction another.
Respectfully submitted,
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